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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the impact of intra-party democratization processes on party 
membership. We analyze the opinions and attitudes of enrolled members on intra-party 
democracy instruments and on the use of open primaries. We investigate, with original datasets 
on Italy, the relationship between primaries and party members. How do enrolled members 
perceive internal democratization and primaries? Which factors contribute to explaining 
grassroots members’ opinion on primaries? We use the case of the Italian Democratic Party 
(PD) to argue that different subsets of the party membership (divided into new-style and old-
style members, on the basis of their relationship with the party and their participatory style) 
have different views on primaries. Quantitative analysis of survey data on party members 
reveals two main findings. Our first result is that members approve and positively assess the 
adoption of new procedures of intra-party democracy. Secondly, membership style matters: old-
style members react to the adoption of primary elections differently than new-style members. 
Indeed, old-style members understand primaries as a renovated chance of participating in the 
party’s activities, whereas for new-style members primaries give the opportunity for a new 
mode of participation. Our findings contribute to the existing empirical research on intra-party 
democracy and party membership and have important implications for the triangular link 
between parties, members and primaries. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at assessing the organizational consequences on party membership of intra-
party democracy procedures such as the use of open primary elections. This is a crucial issue for 
understanding the recent organizational developments of political parties. Parties in Western 
Europe have been facing three significant declining trends that have altered their relationship 
with the grassroots: voter loyalty, party membership, and the importance of cleavage politics. 
Several authors pointed out that it is the ‘party on the ground’ dimension that is facing a real 
crisis (Cross & Katz, 2013: 65). The two main organizational responses that parties have 
recently elaborated to cope with such challenges are the expansion of intra-party democracy and 
the introduction of new forms of party membership. In particular, several parties have adopted a 
wide range of internal organizational reforms that, at least formally, give members more say 
over outcomes. Direct democracy is now used in several intra-party decision-making procedures 
such as candidate and leadership selection and formulation of policy positions (Cross & Pilet, 
2013). Several European parties have adopted open primaries, meaning party internal elections 
for selecting political leaders or candidates for office (either for parliamentary elections or for 
chief executive mandates, at all levels) that entail votes by members, sympathizers and 
registered voters. 
These two responses trigger significant modifications in the role and power of grassroots 
activists, while party organizational change generates, in general, potential conflicts among 
traditional party delegates, activists and supporters. As argued by Scarrow (2014) and by Gauja 
(2014), internal democratization processes are often accompanied by the creation of more 
diverse affiliation options (or ‘membership types’) for citizens (Gauja, 2014: 9). These 
organizational reforms implement more individualized participatory opportunities that blur the 
distinction between party members and non-members (namely, supporters). The creation of 
different types of membership by parties – such as the development of formalized supporters’ 
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networks or the creation of participatory opportunities for non-members – clearly affects the 
role and powers of traditional affiliated members. 
The main research questions we address are the following: how do enrolled members 
perceive internal democratization and primaries? Which factors contribute to explaining 
grassroots members’ opinion on primaries? This paper explores, with original survey data on 
Italy, the relationship between primaries and party members and how the former are perceived 
by the latter.  
The Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD) is well suited for exploring these 
questions since it has used open primaries for more than a decade, and they involve both party 
supporters and enrolled members in internal decision-making (Seddone & Venturino, 2013b). 
Also, PD is the only Italian party that adopted both democratization reforms and primary 
elections during the past few years. The PD was created in 2007 with the merger of the leftist, 
post-communist party ‘Democrats of the Left’ (Democratici di Sinistra, DS, previously called 
‘PDS’) and the centre-left party ‘The Daisy’ (La Margherita). What makes the PD case 
particularly interesting for the purposes of this paper is the fact that the party is the heir of both 
the Catholic and communist political cultures and of their mass-based organizational settings. 
However, since 2007 the new party reformed the structures of the two founding organizations 
by making them more open, flexible, transparent and democratic. 
Several PD members were previously enrolled in the DS, the Daisy, the Italian Communist 
Party (PCI) and/or the Italian Christian Democrats (DC), which were mass-based parties. Other 
members joined the party - a new, flexible and inclusive organization - only after its creation in 
2007. This means that PD integrates two distinct categories of enrolled members: those who 
joined after 2007 and those who were previously enrolled in the founding parties. The two 
groups experience partisan engagement in dissimilar ways. They were, in fact, politically 
socialized into the party internal life through different patterns and structure their relationship 
with the party in a varying fashion. Their ‘style’ of involvement in the party varies because they 
have been politically socialized within diverse organizational settings. While, by creating 
different types of membership (full member, supporter, cyber-member, etc.), political parties 
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now provide multi-speed membership opportunities (Scarrow, 2014), in parties resulting from 
the merger of two previously mass-based parties but adopting new organizational models after 
the merger, members enrolled before or after the merger are characterized by different ‘styles’ 
of membership. While the ‘type of membership’ concerns the modes of partisan affiliation, the 
‘style of membership’ concerns the socialization into and the adaptation to party organizational 
models. This paper is about the latter. 
Yet, since open primaries have been around for 12 years now, it is important to explore 
whether PD members, who are socialized to at least two different styles of partisan engagement, 
evaluate and react to inclusive decision-making procedures, which allow both members and 
non-enrolled supporters to select candidates for elections at all levels and/or the party leader. In 
addition, we need to assess to what extent party members agree to share rights and powers with 
non-enrolled supporters. How do members who are socialized into traditional forms of 
mobilization within mass-based parties react to the adoption of such inclusive procedures of 
internal decision-making as open primaries?  
The central proposition of this paper is that members of the Italian PD have different 
attitudes towards primary elections depending on their style of membership and depending on 
their levels of activism. The paper is therefore relevant to research on the influence of the 
expansion of intra-party democracy as a response to party decline, especially the ‘party on the 
ground’ dimension. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section we offer an overview of the literature 
on intra-party democracy and its influence on party membership; the second section provides a 
brief discussion of party politics in Italy as well as of the PD’s experience with intra-party 
democracy and outlines our theoretical expectations; the third section discusses the main 
methodological issues concerning data and the analytical approach developed in this article; 
section four presents and discusses our main findings. Conclusions follow. 
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Party Membership and Intra-Party Democracy 
 
The meaning and nature of party membership has significantly evolved in the last decades 
across Western democracies. Political parties have changed their organizational structures by 
weakening the relationship with members and voters. This is, for instance, supported by data on 
membership size, whose figures are evidently declining in several contemporary democracies 
(van Biezen et al., 2012). Nowadays, parties are less linked to their grassroots; they are less on 
the ground and more in public office (Dalton et al., 2011). If compared to mass parties, they 
have little in common. Indeed, the recent process of party organizational change has reshaped 
the relationship between the party and its members and supporters (Young, 2013: 75), and the 
old mass-party organizational structures, rooted in grassroots membership and ideologically 
distinctive, are being replaced by organizational permeability and mobilization of party 
supporters. 
Intra-party democracy is often used in the scholarly literature as a very broad term that refers 
to an ample range of methods for “including party members in intra-party deliberation and 
decision-making” (Scarrow, 2005: 3). Though aware of the theoretical tension between 
participatory and representative conceptions of democracy within parties (Hazan & Rahat, 
2010), in line with Scarrow (2005), we define intra-party democracy on the basis of the 
inclusive and unmediated nature of internal party decision-making processes. The concept is 
mostly operationalized on the basis of the degree of inclusiveness of leadership and candidate 
selection processes, but also by looking at the procedures allowing members to have a say in the 
formation of the party program. In this paper, we focus on the adoption of primaries for 
selecting candidates and leaders as a measure of intra-party democracy. 
The adoption of primary elections can be seen as an example of a party reaction to a crisis of 
legitimacy. The increasing diffusion of inclusive procedures for selecting candidates and leaders 
empirically underlines a change in party strategies for electoral and political mobilization. The 
rationale is therefore more tactical than ideological. Primary elections are becoming quite 
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popular among European parties, which have adapted the U.S. model, adjusting it to the 
particular political and institutional contexts in their countries (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Cross & 
Blais, 2011; Sandri et al., 2015). The inclusiveness of these procedures influences the 
relationship among parties, members and supporters. In many European parties, an internal 
debate has been recently launched on whether to adopt open primaries for the selection of their 
candidates. Also, several parties in France, Italy, and Greece are led by leaders chosen under 
primary elections, which are designed to increase internal democracy by broadening the circle 
of individuals empowered to choose the party head. Thus, if Italy and France have launched this 
process of internal democratization by adopting open primaries for selecting leaders and 
candidates, the same trend is now affecting also the Labour Party in the UK and the Spanish 
PSOE.1 
Inclusiveness leads to a reorganization of collective and selective incentives, which 
classically determine the participation within political parties (Clark & Wilson, 1961). Allowing 
participation of supporters not formally enrolled in the party implies that those selectors can 
participate in a very important moment of party life, without any real or structured involvement 
in the party. Though the allocation of these new incentives can also trigger distortions in 
internal power distribution, members and non-members thus share, with different engagement 
in internal activism, the same participative selective incentives. 
However, a closer look reveals that the high degree of inclusiveness of open primaries is 
aimed at mobilizing supporters as well as regularly affiliated members. In fact, primary 
elections promote a new image of political parties, much more democratic and transparent, open 
to all members who are finally admitted into the smoke-filled rooms (Hopkin, 2001: 344). Yet 
the real targets of this mobilizing strategy are the voters (Cross & Katz, 2013: 10). Inclusiveness 
of open primaries means that both members and supporters without any formal affiliation take 
part in core decision-making processes, such as the selection of candidates and party leaders. 
This is bound to affect party organization. However, this also means that these two categories of 
selectors are very different from a political standpoint. If enrolled members might be easily 
																																								 																				
1	For instance, the Catalan Socialists have held primaries for selecting the mayoral candidate for Barcelona in 2015: 
http://www.primariesobertes2015.cat/. 
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considered to be strongly involved and interested in internal party life, this is not necessarily 
true for supporters, who remain external to party structures. Incentives for intra-party 
mobilization are very different, and they could bring to different outcomes in terms of the 
internal organizational relationship.  
 
Italian-Style Primaries 
 
The adoption of open primaries for selecting candidates for public office and party leaders 
can be considered as one of the main developments in Italian party politics in the last ten years.2 
In Italy, the very first open primaries at national level were held in 2005 for selecting the 
candidate of the center-left coalition for the 2006 general elections. Since then, the use of 
primaries has spread, especially at the local level, where several center-left parties (often in 
coalitions led by the PD) used them to select their candidates for municipal elections (Pasquino 
& Venturino, 2009; Seddone & Valbruzzi, 2012)3. Open primaries worked as a foundation myth 
and a crucial element of party identification for the PD. The creation of this party4 coincided 
with the organization of an open primary election for selecting the new party leader, which in 
the intentions of the founding parties’ elites would serve as a celebratory event necessary to 
finalize a long and troubled merging process5. The PD’s internal regulations recognize these 
inclusive procedures as an instrument of intra-party democracy and define open primaries as the 
main instrument for selecting candidates for public office at local, regional and national level as 
																																								 																				
2 Following Rahat and Hazan (2010), we argue that candidate selection and leader election are two different political 
processes, but in the paper we use the term “primary elections” for identifying both processes interchangeably. Also, 
a primary election is an election that narrows the field of candidates before an election for office. Strictly speaking, 
the term “primary elections” refers only to the selection of a party’s (or party coalition’s) candidates for public office, 
not to the selection of candidates for public office and the selection of a party’s leaders. We are using the term 
“primaries” in an unusually broad sense, which refer to the concept of “primary and leadership elections”. Moreover, 
the same type of open primary elections is used in all intra-party elections in the PD, and the process does not differ 
by level of government or region. 
3 The phenomenon has become very relevant: since 2004, nearly 960 primary elections for selecting candidates for 
public office have been organized at local, regional, provincial and national level (Seddone & Venturino, 2013a). 
Moreover, the PD has also organized open primary elections to select: the party leader in 2007, 2009 and 2013, the 
chief executive candidate in 2005 and 2012 and candidates at national elections in 2012. This means that such 
inclusive procedures have significantly affected the party on the ground, involving (and socializing) members and 
supporters into this new mode of political participation. 
4 The new party is the result of the merger between the Democrats of the Left (heir of PCI) and the Daisy/Democracy 
is Freedom (heir of the leftist faction of DC). 
5 For space reasons, we cannot discuss at length here the process that brought to the creation of PD, i.e., the merging 
of the two main political parties and their political cultures. For more details we refer to Bordandini et al. (2008).  
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well as candidates for party offices such as party leader.6 Thus, primaries have become a 
distinctive feature of the PD which, in a party system strongly characterized by personalization 
of politics and personal parties, is the only party offering an alternative organizational model. 
The Italian party system provides an appropriate case study as several parties have adopted 
open or closed (entailing a full membership vote) primary elections during the past few years. In 
fact, if primaries are usually associated with the PD, Italian party members have familiarized 
themselves with the instrument and elaborated informed opinions on the topic since the 
increased use of primary elections at different levels since 2005. The participative success of 
PD’s primary elections and the good impact on public debate (Bobba & De Luca, 2016) 
triggered a process of contagion. 
Recently, in fact, other Italian parties, also from the right side of the political spectrum, have 
sporadically resorted to (or are currently discussing  the adoption of) primary elections for 
selecting their candidates or party leaders. The Northern League, for example, selected its party 
leader through a closed primary election in 2013 (Porcellato & Rombi, 2014). The Five Star 
Movement selected candidates for the 2013 general election through closed legislative primaries 
(Rombi & Seddone, 2015). The niche party Italy of Values also resorted to inclusive procedures 
for choosing its party leader. The rapid spread of such inclusive selection methods in the Italian 
political system requires an in depth understanding of their real impact at organizational level 
concerning, specifically, the relationship with party members. Within the Italian party system, 
the PD constitutes the most useful case study, because of the varied nature of its membership 
and the institutionalized use of primaries, and can provide valuable insights on the 
consequences of internal democratization processes, as discussed below. 
The party model adopted by the PD in 2007 constitutes a relevant organizational innovation 
from the membership side, where members and voters are called to select not only candidates 
but also the party leader, sharing the same right to participate and decide. Such an innovation, 
																																								 																				
6 Since then, the party has organized almost 80% of all primaries held in Italy (alone or in coalition with smaller 
leftist parties). At least at the local level, a “contagion effect” can be recently seen: of over 952 local primaries (for 
selecting the mayoral candidate) held between 2004 and 2015, at least 37 have been organized by right wing parties 
(mainly by Berlusconi’s former PDL) or center-right coalitions (Seddone & Valbruzzi, 2013; Sandri & Venturino, 
2016). 
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influential for other Italian parties7 and several other post-mass, mainstream center-left, social-
democratic parties in Europe, is even more significant when considering the long history of the 
predecessors of the two main founding parties of the PD. The PCI and DC can be fairly 
considered as ideal-types of the mass parties described by the literature on political parties, with 
a crucial role for activists and members in party life. Although some smaller parties have also 
used primaries, the PD is the only large nationwide party that employs them. Also, in terms of 
party competition, PD is one of the biggest Italian political parties – having the broadest 
membership base in Italy (Sandri, Seddone & Bulli, 2015) – being in government at national 
level since 2011, currently holding 301 seats in the lower chamber and governing 17 over 20 
Italian regions, alone or in coalition. 
In light of this discussion, our first hypothesis relies on the difference in the style of party 
membership. We categorize PD grassroots members on the basis of their ‘membership style’. It 
relates to the relationship that individual members have with the party’s organizational 
structures and depends on the varying patterns of socialization into specific organizational 
models: mass-party model (characterized by a continuous and stable activity in party internal 
life) and post-mass (organizationally permeable) party model that provide different visions of 
the role of members in the organization (Young, 2013). The distinction between “old-style” and 
“new-style” members is made on the basis of the year of enrollment: we distinguish simply 
between members that joined before (and who were previously members of one of the founding 
parties) or after 2007. The distinction assumes that the two groups can be categorized on the 
basis of the type of partisan socialization they have experienced within the party, which 
determines the nature of their engagement.  
So, we distinguish between: (a) old-style members, who were previously enrolled in one of 
the founding parties and thus are socialized into mass membership parties’ organizational 
settings. They are used to more traditional and stable forms of partisan affiliation and party-
members linkage; (b) new-style members, who enrolled in the party after the creation of the PD 
																																								 																				
7 The ideological nature of PD within the current Italian party system can be described as “center-left”, meaning that 
the ideological stances of the party (in terms of manifesto, policies and average positions of its affiliates and elected 
officials) are similar to those of an average European mainstream social-democratic party and, while being more 
moderate, especially on ethical and socio-economic issues, than those of the far left (e.g., SEL), PD’s positions are 
clearly more leftist than the positions of the main center and rightist parties (UDC, IDV, FI, FDI, NDC, LN, etc.). 
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in 2007, and thus are socialized into more flexible forms of partisan engagement. They are used 
to a supporter-based, organizationally permeable party and to a less traditional and inclusive 
model of relationship with the party8. If old-style members come from a tradition of activism 
within membership-oriented parties, new-style members are enrolled in a new kind of party, 
where the differences between enrolled and non-enrolled activists are less defined and more 
blurred. 
We argue that old-style and new-style members show distinct evaluations of such inclusive 
methods of candidate and party leader selection, reacting in a different way to the inclusiveness 
of open primary elections. Primaries provide an ambivalent opportunity of internal 
mobilization, perceived quite differently by the two types of members. For those PD members 
who already experienced party activism within the old mass parties, primaries constitute a new 
opportunity of participation that follows patterns of involvement similar to those present in 
mass parties but with even more powers granted to them. Members are deeply involved in the 
organization of the primary competition, both during the electoral campaign and on the election-
day with their presence at the polls. Therefore, we argue that old-style members’ engagement in 
primaries replicates the traditional mass party internal activities. This engagement entails a 
positive evaluation of primaries and their inclusive features. However, primaries entail also a 
new distribution of collective and selective incentives. Members now share power and rights 
with external supporters who are not involved in the party organization: a different degree of 
activism corresponds to a similar role in the decision process (Heidar & Saglie, 2003). It can be 
the case, in fact, that old-style members may oppose primaries because they consider them to be 
“red herrings” that divert the membership from other types of internal activism that contributes 
to and promotes intra-party democracy and this could negatively affect their participatory 
attitude in such events. 
Compared to old-style members, new-style members have not been previously politically 
socialized to intra-party activities. They joined the new party adopting a more inclusive concept 
																																								 																				
8 The crucial concept of ‘political culture’ could also be helpful in explaining the different characteristics of new and 
old style members, in particular in the cases of members previously enrolled to the former PCI and DC. We cannot 
discuss this at length here for space reasons, but for the specific literature on the Italian parties' culture and 
participation models, see mainly: Pizzorno (1966); Panebianco (1982); Raniolo (2007). 
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of party membership. Those members are probably less inclined to a continuous and stable 
participation within the party and more used to cognitive mobilization. This means that they 
share a very high interest in politics, but a lower level of mobilization. Their opinion about 
primaries will be more positive than the one of old-style members. In particular, they would be 
attracted by the possibility of participating in intra-party activities in a less structured way, 
which has the advantage of the collective incentives provided by primaries, without the cost of 
intense activism as in the traditional mass parties (Scarrow et al., 2000; Aylott et al.. 2012; 
Seddone & Venturino, 2013b). We then expect a different attitude towards primaries depending 
on membership style in the following way: 
Hypothesis 1. New-style members show a more positive opinion of primary elections than 
old-style members. 
Our second hypothesis argues that a positive evaluation of primary elections might be related 
to the degree of activism. The literature is not uncontroversial. On the one hand, some studies 
suggest a beneficial effect of primaries for promoting participation. For instance, Heidar and 
Saglie (2003) say that primaries enhance participation of new supporters who are not 
traditionally interested in intra-party participation, whereas for other scholars the introduction of 
primaries strengthens the degree of participation of members who are already highly mobilized 
(Cross & Blais, 2011; Young, 2013; Wauters, 2014). We argue that open primary elections give 
both to external supporters, who are not formally enrolled in the party, and to party members, 
who are more active in party internal life, the same rights to affect processes of intra-party 
decision-making. In other words, open primaries allow the participation of individuals 
characterized by different degrees of involvement in party activities, and thus by very different 
material and immaterial resources associated with political involvement. External supporters 
and party members are characterized by different types and degrees of engagement in party 
activities, but they share similar rights and powers with regards to important internal decision-
making areas. Active party members may therefore perceive open primaries as an internal 
procedure that could limit and weaken their role within the party by recognizing a new central 
role to external supporters, who in turn are not equally involved in party activities. Therefore 
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more active members will thus perceive such inclusive selection methods less positively 
compared to the perception of less active members (Sandri & Pauwels, 2011). On the other 
hand, other studies are, instead, more concerned with negative consequences. In fact, Katz and 
Mair (1995) argue that primaries would weaken the mobilizing potential of rank-and-file 
members by diminishing their power of control on party leadership while other studies show 
that (open) primaries can negatively affect the candidate loyalty to the party because the 
nomination is legitimated outside the party, directly by primary voters (Hopkin, 2001; 
Ansolabehere et al., 2006). 
Although we do not line up with any of these standpoints, we recognize that, given that more 
active members would want to hold on to the greater power their participation produces, we 
would expect that they would have a less positive opinion of primaries than less active members 
have: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the degree of members’ participation within the party, the less 
positive is their opinion of primary elections.  
 
Data, Measurement, and Method 
 
We test our hypotheses using original data from a 2013 Web survey on PD enrolled 
members realized right after the center-left coalition primaries for selecting the Prime 
Ministerial candidate for the 2013 general elections (data are from the Candidate & Leader 
Selection Standing Group: www.cals.it). The survey has been realized on the basis of CAWI 
methodology and includes all PD members who provided their email address (N=100.000). The 
Web survey has been available from March 25 to April 14.9 At the end of 2011, the PD had 
763,783 members nationwide and during the three weeks of the survey, a total of 13,666 
responses have been collected (26 of whom were members living abroad). The figure represents 
1.8% of the overall PD membership. However, we note that since the questionnaire has been 
																																								 																				
9 Members agreed to be contacted by the party. The original plan was to keep the survey available for 30 days, but the 
resignation of the PD leader, related to the troubled election of the President of the Republic, forced us to close the 
survey before the deadline. 
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submitted only to those members who had previously provided their email address and the 
authorization to be contacted, the sample is inevitably biased for the sake of limiting the cost of 
data collection and non-sampling errors (see Groves, 1989: 246-7).10 
Our dependent variable represents the opinion of party members of primary elections. To 
operationalize members’ general opinion of primaries, we use a dummy variable (1 meaning 
positive opinions and 0 meaning negative opinions) constructed by creating a cumulative index 
using a battery of four items on the basis of the question, “How much do you agree with the 
following statements?”: (1) primaries increase divisiveness within the party; (2) primaries 
improve my evaluation of the party; (3) primaries reduce members’ power; and (4) primaries 
promote the renewal of the political class. Respondents were asked to score these items on a 
four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 ‘strongly agree’. We recoded 
them into dichotomous variables indicating negative (strongly disagree, disagree) and positive 
(strongly agree, agree) opinions on the items proposed (Figure 1). The items 1 and 2 were 
reverted in order to allocate higher scores to the answers that were taken to represent a positive 
opinion on primaries. The four dichotomous variables have been then added into a cumulative 
index (Figure 2). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Our two main independent variables are membership style and party activism. Membership 
style is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for new-style members and zero for old-style 
members. Old-style and new-style members’ profiles appear to be quite different. In terms of 
																																								 																				
10 We note that the regional distribution presents some distortions. The most over-represented region is Lombardia 
(+9.3%): here respondents are in fact 17.7% of the sample, though they are only 8.4% of enrolled. Conversely, 
Campania (-7.2%) is the most under-represented region with only 1% of interviewed (see Table SI2). Another source 
of distortion might be given by the over-representation of new-style members and under-representation of old-style 
members, given the stronger propensity for younger citizens to be online. As robustness checks, we re-estimate our 
model by splitting the sample by age and by omitting one region at a time. These analyses, reported in the online 
appendix, do not alter the robustness of our results. Therefore, also considering the large number of respondents (and 
the high frame population coverage), we are reassured that our data can be used for conducting explorative analyses 
on the relationship between intra-party democracy and party members. However, we emphasize that the validity of 
our results is only guaranteed by the large N and that any generalization of the results to the general population of 
party members should be elaborated very cautiously. 
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socio-demographic characteristics (Table SI3), the two types of members are quite distinct 
regarding both gender and age distribution. Among new-style members there is a higher 
presence of women than in both the whole sample and old-style member subgroup. Besides, 
new-style members are also younger than both the whole sample and old-style member 
subgroup. The differences in age distribution between the two groups correspond to different 
political socialization patterns and thus to different experience of political activism; and these 
differences influence their perceptions and attitudes towards intra-party activities and 
participation in general. Yet the two groups are less differentiated in terms of educational 
attainment, which is generally high. 
In terms of political profile (Table SI4), when looking into previous party affiliation of old-
style members, we find a clear prevalence (68.1%) of old-style members coming from 
communist or post-communists parties (PCI, PDS, DS), whereas old-style members coming 
from Catholic parties (DC and the Daisy) are only 22%. This distribution is also reflected in the 
ideological self-placement declared by PD members on a left-right scale: 51% of old-style 
members position themselves on the left side of the scale, while new-style members show a 
slightly more differentiated pattern: there is a higher identification with the center-left category 
(45.5% vs. 41.3% among the general sample and 38.3% among old-style members). 
We measure the level of party activism by members’ weekly activity in terms of hours of 
engagement within the party (Figure 3). What clearly emerges is that, in general, members seem 
to be little involved in party life activities. Indeed, 28.2% of them declares not to participate at 
all in any party activity during the week and 30% devotes less than 2 hours per week to militant 
engagement, which is the dominant category considering the whole sample. Conversely, only 
4.1% are involved more than 20 hours per week, a figure that goes up to 9% including also 
those who spend between 10 and 20 hours in the party. Yet, though the general pattern is similar 
between membership styles, old-style members are more committed and engaged than new-
style members are committed. More than one third of new-style members seems to be very 
distant from the party; whereas, if we consider those who have been enrolled in the predecessor 
parties, the picture is slightly different. Our argument suggests, in fact, that activists participate 
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in a different way according to their membership style. While old-style members show a more 
assiduous and consistent level of participation, new-style members seem to be quite distant from 
party activity and this distance could be related to a different kind of political socialization. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
We test our arguments using a simple logistic regression model: 
 !"# = !! + !! !"!#$%&'" + !! !"#$%$&' + !! !"#$%"&' + ! 
 
where: 
 
MOP = party members’ general opinion on primary elections (1 if positive, zero if negative) 
 
MEMBSTYLE = membership style (1 if new-style, zero if old-style) 
 
ACTIVISM = party members’ activism (hours of engagement within the party) 
 
α0 is the intercept and ε is the error term. 
We also include several controls in our analysis. As the U.S. literature on divisiveness (e.g., 
Wichowsky & Niebler, 2010) and negativity (e.g., Peterson & Djupe, 2005) of primary 
elections campaigns suggests, the evaluation of primary elections can also be related to the final 
result of the contest or to the primary competition itself. We control for this possibility by using 
the last coalition primaries held in 2012 for selecting the Prime Ministerial candidate of the 
center-left coalition for the 2013 general election – which were different than the 2007 
primaries for selecting the party leader11. To understand the assessment of the selectors enrolled 
																																								 																				
11 The two main candidates, Pier Luigi Bersani – leader of the party previously selected by primaries in the 2009 – 
and Matteo Renzi – his young challenger, now PM, and former mayor of Florence – represent two extremely 
different ideas of party mobilization: the former expresses an old-style idea of party organization, very close to local 
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in PD in the aftermath of such a divisive and publicly debated primary, we have created an 
additive index of satisfaction with the 2012 primaries, summing up the items of Figure 4 and 
dividing the measure into three categories of satisfaction (low, medium and high). Eight items 
were proposed to the respondents as Likert scales (in which respondents could fully agree, 
partly agree, partly disagree or fully disagree with). Highest scores went to the respondents who 
strongly agreed. After performing a principal component analysis (Table SI5), we saw that all 
items (but one) loaded significantly on one individual factor, dealing with the satisfaction with 
intra-party democracy. The eight items were thus merged in a cumulative scale (Cronbach’s 
Alpha: 0.67). 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
In general, both types are quite satisfied and there seems not to be a large variation between 
membership styles. However, old-style members are more satisfied with the former secretary’s 
victory, their personal contribution to the primary campaign and the relationship with their party 
colleagues compared to new-style members, proving the existence of a different vision of party 
life between the two of them. Among the most positive assessments, the dominant categories 
are party leader’s success for old-style members and the behavior of the defeated candidates for 
new-style members, revealing somehow the preferences of members. In fact, the former seem to 
be more connected to the secretary than the latter, implying not only a different conception of 
the party but also suggesting a different participative attitude. Although it is the least chosen 
category, it is curious to notice that the ones not at all satisfied are the new-style members, 
registering slightly higher levels of dissatisfaction compared to the others. 
Since a positive view of the last primary might be driven by the fact that the candidate voted 
for the winner of the competition (and, conversely, a negative view might be influenced by the 
fact that the candidate voted for who lost the contest),  in our model we also account for this 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
branches and deeply rooted on the ground; the latter, instead, represents a catch-all approach, more oriented to 
mobilize external supporters and perceived as a breakaway figure from the consolidated establishment of the party. 
17	
possibility including a dummy variable for winners and losers in the first round of the 2012 
primaries (1 if the candidate voted won the nomination, zero otherwise). Our model also 
controls for standard socio-demographic characteristics (age, education, frequency of reading 
newspapers both in print and online, frequency of watching the news on TV, and frequency of 
following political debate on Websites and social networks) as well as members’ political 
characteristics (left-right self-placement and interest in politics). The indicators for these 
variables were integrated in the questionnaire we use in this survey. The source is thus the same 
than for the independent and dependent variables. More details on these variables (response 
categories and descriptive statistics) can be found in the appendix (Tables SI1, SI3, and SI4). 
 
Results 
 
Results are presented in Table 1. We have estimated three different logistic regressions with 
PD members’ opinion about primaries as a dependent variable (a dummy in which 1 includes 
the positive opinions and zero the negative opinions). Results from the baseline model (Model 
1) are consistent and stable in Model 2 and Model 3, where we control for members’ 
satisfaction with 2012 primaries and for standard socio-graphic and political characteristics, 
respectively.  
From a preliminary overview of the results, membership style is positive and significant, 
meaning that new-style members are more likely to have a more positive opinion on primaries 
than old-style members have (Hypothesis 1). Party activism also matters in the direction 
expected in Hypothesis 2. In fact, results seem to confirm a negative relationship between 
opinion on primaries and party activism, that is, the more one participates, the less happy with 
primaries one is. More precisely, the higher the number of hours spent for the party, the less 
positive the opinion of primaries. These findings support our reflections about the influence of 
inclusiveness on collective and selective incentives. Indeed, among those members more 
engaged and involved in party life, the evaluation of primaries and their inclusiveness seem to 
be less positive. This finding is coherent with the idea that primaries, somehow, redefine the 
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logic of political participation within the party, because – at the end of the day – the activist 
members draw near the external supporters, who participate from time to time without any 
formal enrolment and real commitment to the party. 
However, we are very cautious in the interpretation of our results and prefer not to talk in 
terms of causal relationship, for we only have one data point; hence no time dimension can be 
taken into account.12 At any rate, on the basis of the Chi² associated to the Log-likelihood, we 
can see that all three models are significant and that the third model containing all the predictors 
provides the most satisfactory fit to the data. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Note that satisfaction with 2012 primaries is positively associated with our dependent 
variable and remains significant when controlling for the candidate who won the first round of 
the competition. Nonetheless, we recall that given the clear endogeneity problem with this 
variable, no convincing hypothesis can be proposed. We would rather need individual level data 
collected on the basis of panel surveys in order to identify changes in members’ attitudes before 
and after primary elections are held. Panel data would give us the chance to solve the 
endogeneity problem and track members over time to build a new research hypothesis linking 
the two variables. Model 3 tests the stability of our theoretical design with the inclusion of some 
socio-graphic variables (age, education, frequency of reading newspapers both on paper and 
online, frequency of watching the news on TV, and frequency of following political debate on 
websites and social networks) and political controls (left-right self-placement and interest in 
politics). The only controls that seem to matter are age, which is positive and significant, 
meaning that the youngest (16-34 age classes) are the least happy with primaries (though most 
of the observations lie in the 45-64 age classes), and left-right self-placement, which is negative 
																																								 																				
12 To account for the issue of regional over- and under-representation above mentioned, we have re-estimated the 
baseline model omitting one region at a time and this did not affect the significance and direction of the coefficients 
of our main explanatory variables. This analysis is available upon request. 
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and as well significant. Yet this is not surprising as PD is a center-left party and its members are 
essentially split into the left and center-left categories of the continuum. 
Since the coefficients of the logistic regression might be tricky and not as easy to interpret as 
coefficients of simple OLS regressions, we consider the predicted probability of each main 
independent variable on the dependent variable using margins at means. These predict the effect 
of each variable of interest on the probability that the dependent variable equals 1, holding all 
the independent variables at their sample means, except for the dummy variables held at their 
mode. Figures 5 and 6 show the results for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively. New-
style members were expected to have a more positive opinion of primary elections and this 
finds confirmation plotting the margins at means of membership styles on the dependent 
variable. However, a closer look suggests that if, on one side, it seems confirmed that old-style 
members have a less positive opinion of primaries than new-style members have, on the other 
side, the former are quite happy as well with the primary tool. In other words, both types of 
members have a positive judgment of primary elections, but new-style members are a bit more 
satisfied.13 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Figure 6 shows the predicted probability of the influence of activism within the party on the 
general opinion of primaries. The graph suggests that the more time members spend for the 
party, the less positive is their evaluation of primaries (most of the observations are 
concentrated in the second and third category from the left, where the sticks of the 95% 
confidence intervals are smaller). This is also consistent with what we have found previously: 
since old-style members are more active within and spend more time in the party than new-style 
members spend (Figure 3) and the former share a less positive opinion of primaries than the 
																																								 																				
13 For this reason, we have decided to omit from the analysis interaction terms between membership style and other 
independent variables, as both types of members evaluate positively the participative practice. We have also run 
separate models with interaction terms, but none of them was statistically significant. 
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latter share (Figure 6), then the ones more engaged and involved in the party are also the ones 
with a less positive conception of primaries. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
We have conducted additional analyses (Tables SI7-SI9) to assess whether our general 
findings are also consistent across PD members and we have found that such findings hold for 
the large majority of our sample. Specifically, we have split our sample across age, education 
and interest in politics. Although, as we have already noted, despite their membership style, PD 
members are in general educated individuals and very interested in politics, it is worth checking 
whether there are substantial differences across members. Our results apply accurately to both 
younger and mature members, medium-high educated members and among those who are very 
interested in and passionate for politics. Probably because of the very low number of cases, our 
hypotheses are not consistent across the youngest, less educated and less interested in politics.  
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
How do members of the Italian Democratic Party perceive primary elections? This is the 
core question addressed in this paper aiming to give an explorative  evaluation of the state of the 
art of primary elections in Italy, given that such measures of intra-party democracy have been 
operating for a decade. Since such competitions imply the adoption of more inclusive 
procedures for candidate and leader selection, inclusiveness leads to a redefinition of collective 
and selective incentives, which classically determine the participation within political parties.  
Our analysis focuses on two major aspects: party members themselves, namely their 
membership style, and party activism. Through the quantitative analysis of an original dataset 
from a Web survey distributed to PD members, two major elements emerge. 
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In relation to the first point, given that the PD was created from the ashes of the former 
Christian Democratic Party and the Italian Communist Party and that many other activists 
joined it without belonging to any of the previous parties, substantial differences do exist across 
PD members. For this reason, we have coined two labels that help us distinguish these two 
diverse groups: old-style members and new-style members. Because of their previous 
enrollment in other parties (with mainly communist and Catholic roots) before joining PD, the 
former come from a militant experience within hierarchical mass party structures, oriented 
towards members as important players in the party. This situation is completely absent for new-
style members, who joined a party for the very first time and were familiarized with more open 
and inclusive party structures. Given these distinct political socialization patterns, we can see 
that the perception of primaries changes according to membership style. 
Our first result is that membership style matters: old-style members react to the adoption of 
primary elections differently than new-style members react. Though both membership styles 
understand primaries as an opportunity for participating and assign a positive opinion to 
primaries, the premises are quite different. In fact, old-style members relate primaries to the 
“good old days” of the mass parties, in which members were a vibrant and essential element of 
the party whereas for new-style members primaries give the opportunity for a new mode of 
participation. Thus, although we register a little involvement in party activities (van Biezen, 
Mair & Poguntke, 2012), the former experience a more assiduous and consistent participation 
within the party compared to the latter who seem to be more distant and less engaged. However, 
both types give quite a positive opinion of primaries as a reliable tool for participation, though 
new-style members are happier than old-style members.  
The fact that both old-style and new-style members overall approve and positively assess the 
adoption of new procedures of intra-party democracy is quite relevant. This aspect might have 
strong theoretical implications. Although party elites often disagree on the potential benefits and 
effectiveness of primaries, in Italy the party base still perceives this instrument quite positively 
(the contrary of what happens in France, for instance). Primaries serve the linkage role of parties 
by developing crucial participatory instruments for citizens and activists, rather than 
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constituting a threat to party organizational strength and consistency as previous studies argued 
(for a review, see: Cross & Katz, 2013). 
In relation to party activism, our results are strongly in line with previous research on the 
negative consequences of intra-party democracy (see e.g., Katz & Mair, 1995; Hopkin, 2001; 
Ansolabehere et al., 2006). In fact, we find that party activism is negatively associated to 
members’ general opinion of primaries. In this sense, primaries are also perceived as a lighter 
way of participating in party life, as the members’ positive opinion declines when the level of 
involvement in party activities increases. Our findings show important implications of these 
differing attitudes for parties as participatory organizations: internal democratization might have 
actually stripped activists of some important responsibilities and this has led to an increase of 
their frustration and dissatisfaction. Our study suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to 
party activists’ reactions to organizational changes, but affects also the attitudes of less 
mobilized grassroots members. 
Our study has also important implications for the relationship between party membership 
and intra-party democracy beyond the Italian case. Given that this constitutes mainly a first, 
empirical exploratory study, we can only speculate about how our results might extend to 
primaries elsewhere. However, what clearly emerges from our findings is the fact that party 
members perceive these organizational changes and are affected by them with regard to both 
their attitudes and behaviors. This is particularly relevant for parties’ ability to mobilize and for 
their claims to democratic legitimacy in a context, such as the Italian or Western European ones, 
of increasing public distrust towards parties and their linkage role in society. 
Our findings can be, in fact, applied to several other parties (within Italy and elsewhere) 
given that many European or Western parties have socialized their members and supporters to 
the use of the same type of open primaries for selecting candidates and/or leaders during the last 
decade. Although Italy (or the PD) should not be overstated as a generalizable example of 
primaries or party membership, this case fits the general trend that is emerging in Western 
Europe: for instance, the French PS and EELV, most Finnish and Icelandic parties, as well as 
the Spanish PSOE and UPyD have been increasingly using open primaries to select candidates 
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for party and/or public offices at various territorial levels during the same time frame. While the 
effects of primaries might depend on the organizational traditions of each party, there is little 
reason to believe that the influence on membership would be any different in other post-mass 
parties in Europe from those in Italy. 
The applicability of the results on the Italian PD to the broader Italian and European context 
is related to its potential to be an example of the functioning of other parties concerning the 
adoption of primary elections and their understanding by their members, in particular under the 
variables concerning the party organization model, given the general trend of internal 
democratization spreading across European party systems. Also, PD’s particular position in the 
Italian competition context and its ideological features explain how the adoption of the primary 
elections by one of the main Italian parties can be of some importance in the broader Italian and 
European landscape. 
Our study shows that, in the long run, these organizational innovations could prove useful 
for parties in order to adapt to changing social settings, but also that intra-party democracy is 
not a value per se, but its effectiveness depends on its actual implementation and on the 
disposition of members and supporters to get onboard. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Primary elections and PD membership 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Dependent Variable: PD Members’ General Opinion of Primaries 
Membership Style 0.24*** (0.05) 0.26*** (0.05) 0.33*** (0.05) 
Activity within the Party -0.13*** (0.02) -0.20*** (0.02) -0.17*** (0.02) 
2012 Primary Satisfaction 
 
0.85*** (0.04) 0.85*** (0.05) 
Winner First Round 2012 
  
-0.24*** (0.06) 
Age 
  
0.11*** (0.02) 
Education 
  
0.01 (0.04) 
L-R Self-Placement 
  
-0.10** (0.04) 
Interest in Politics 
  
-0.03 (0.06) 
Newspapers (freq) 
  
-0.03 (0.04) 
TV News (freq) 
  
-0.05 (0.04) 
Websites (freq) 
  
0.01 (0.02) 
Constant 1.04*** (0.08) -0.88*** (0.13) -0.71 (0.40) 
LR chi2 LR chi2 (2) 106.09  LR chi2 (3) 468.99  LR chi2 (11) 484.43  
Prob>chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Psuedo R2 0.01  0.04  0.05  
Log-likelihood -6178.01  -5255.24  -5075.04  
N 10,846 9541 9312 
Notes. Models 1, 2 and 3 are logistic regressions (standard errors in parentheses). *<0.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. General opinion on primary elections (percentages) 
 
 
Figure 2. Index measuring the general opinion on primary elections (percentages) 
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Figure 3. Weekly activity within the party by membership style (percentages) 
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Figure 4. Evaluation of 2012 primaries by membership style (percentages) 
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Figure 5.Predicted probability of membership style on general opinion about primary elections (margins at means). 
 
Notes. Results based on Model 3. Sticks are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6. Predicted probability of involvement within the party on general opinion about primary elections (margins at means). 
Notes. Results based on Model 3. Sticks are 95% confidence intervals. 
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